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Information security in infrastructureless wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is one of the most important research challenges. In
these networks, sensor nodes are typically sprinkled liberally in the field in order to monitor, gather, disseminate, and provide the
sensed data to the command node. Various studies have focused on key establishment schemes in homogeneous WSNs. However,
recent research has shown that achieving survivability in WSNs requires a hierarchy and heterogeneous infrastructure. In this
paper, to address security issues in the heterogeneous WSNs, we propose a secure clustering scheme along with a deterministic
pairwise key management scheme based on public key cryptography. The proposed security mechanism guarantees that any
two sensor nodes located in the same cluster and routing path can directly establish a pairwise key without disclosing any
information to other nodes. Through security performance evaluation, it is shown that the proposed scheme guarantees node-
to-node authentication, high resiliency against node capture, and minimum memory space requirement.
1. Introduction
The extensive rise of using wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
in diverse applications such as hostile, unattended, and
inaccessible environments mandates the users to be more
assured about the security compared to the survivability.
The inherent nature of wireless sensor nodes, such as being
subject to resource constraints (power, processing, and com-
munication), easily captured, and possibly tampered with,
causes other security schemes developed for infrastructure-
based wireless networks to be infeasible for WSNs [1, 2]. An
example of these sensor nodes is the reduced function devices
(RFDs) defined in the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 standard [3].
As long as security schemes provide confidentiality,
authentication, and integrity, which are critical for such
applications, a secure and survivable infrastructure is always
desired. Network survivability has been defined as the ability
of the network to fulfill its mission in the presence of
attacks and/or failures in a timely manner [4]. As a standard
criteria to enhance scalability and survivability in the WSNs,
clustering sensor nodes into some groups is considered in
the literature, see, for example, [5–9]. Due to the energy
constraint nature of wireless sensor nodes and their limited
transmission range, establishing multihop routing toward
the gateway is more eﬃcient than having direct transmission
[7]. Moreover, data transmission consumes the most energy
in comparison with data computation. Consequently, send-
ing signals in an optimal power level is very crucial. From the
security point of view, through compromising a sensor node
by an adversary in a multi-hop path, the information on the
node is exposed, and an attacker might be able to control the
operation of the captured node. Therefore, for the purpose
of securing communication links in WSNs, every message
should be encrypted and authenticated by any two individual
sensor nodes [10].
The secure clustering and key establishments are chal-
lenging problem in the WSNs. Therefore, an eﬃcient
key management scheme should be designed in order to
distribute the cryptographic keys amongst the sensor nodes.
It is noted that using a single traditional symmetric key is
not secure; because sensor nodes are not tamper proof and
upon being captured by an adversary, all information will
be exposed to the adversaries [11]. Recently, incorporating
pairwise keys for secure communication amongst sensor
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nodes in the heterogeneous WSNs has been considered in
[12, 13].
In this paper, we investigate secure clustering of wireless
sensor nodes with evaluating their survivability concurrently.
To date, numerous key establishment schemes have been
proposed for homogeneous WSNs incorporating symmetric
keys, that is, what is mentioned in [1, 11, 14–17]. In these
schemes, the secure connectivity is based on the probability
of sharing some symmetric keys and key materials among
sensor nodes. Note that these schemes not only suﬀer from
high computation cost, communication overhead, and large
memory requirements, but also there is no guarantee for
secure key establishment among all sensor nodes. Moreover,
due to the resource constraint nature of sensor nodes,
employing asymmetric and public key cryptography in
WSNs using these schemes is slow, complex, and infeasible
[18].
Recently, Malan et al., [19], demonstrated that a light-
weight type of public key cryptography called elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) is computationally feasible for resource-
constrained sensor nodes in WSNs. In [20], a public key
cryptography scheme called TinyECC is presented. This
scheme is based on software implementation of ECC on
TinyOS for sensor nodes. To have an acceptable security level,
it has been demonstrated that ECC requires considerably less
resources compared with RSA [21] depending on the key
size. In [22], it has been shown that even RSA can be feasible
for sensor nodes under certain conditions, such as employing
a dedicated hardware accelerator for cryptographic compu-
tations. Furthermore, recent works such as those in [23, 24]
have presented the use of ECC public key cryptography for
WSNs.
In clustered WSNs, there is a hierarchy among the nodes
regarding their capabilities. Gateways are more powerful
and have greater resources while sensor nodes are limited
in resources. In these networks, gateways form a virtual
infrastructure and sensor nodes connect to the gateways in a
direct or multi-hop routes [25]. The gateways are assumed to
be tamper proof and can be used to distribute cryptographic
keys to the sensor nodes. Recent research (see, e.g., [11, 12,
26–29]) has assumed that the adversary is present after node
deployment and key establishment phases. Consequently, the
adversary is unable to compromise the links without actually
capturing a sensor node. However, in situations such as
enemy battle fields, borderline monitoring, and autonomous
networks with high-security requirements, it is not practical
to assume that the adversary does not exist in the field
during deployment and the exchanged information may
be recorded/altered by the adversary. Therefore, a security
mechanism should be proposed to solve this problem.
In this paper, we capitalize on the strength of public key
cryptography to establish secure communication in clustered
WSNs. Since gateways in clustered WSNs are assumed to
be powerful and tamper proof, they can operate as a key
distribution center (KDC) within each cluster. We present
a deterministic pairwise key establishment scheme for the
clustered WSNs using public key cryptography. In compar-
ison with the previous works available in the literature, the
proposed scheme has the following contributions.
(i) We propose a new secure clustering scheme for the
heterogeneous WSNs incorporating ECC. The key
management scheme is performed in the early phase
of clustering and bootstrapping with the assumption
that the adversary exists in the environment.
(ii) Instead of preloading large number of keys into each
sensor node, we embed the public key of the gateways
into each sensor node before deployments. Therefore,
any broadcast from the gateways can be authenticated
easily by the legitimate sensor nodes using elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [30].
(iii) Thememory complexity and the overall communica-
tion overhead of the presented scheme are analyzed
in terms of the number of neighbor nodes available
for each sensor node. Consequently, the number of
symmetric keys required to be stored in each sensor
node is obtained eﬃciently. It is shown that the
memory requirements of the proposed scheme are
less than its counterparts.
(iv) We investigate the node/link compromise probability
regarding the number of hops. Note that when a node
is captured by the adversary, the pairwise nature of
the proposed scheme exposes no information from
other communication links.
In the proposed scheme, all messages broadcasted from the
gateways should be authenticated. Therefore, the messages
from illegitimate users or compromised sensor nodes can be
easily rejected by the other nodes.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we review the related work. The preliminaries and network
model are stated in Section 3. The proposed secure clustering
scheme is presented in Section 4. Section 5 shows an analysis
on node degree in the proposed network model for clustered
WSNs. The performance analysis and simulation results are
reported in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 7.
2. Related Work
In this section, we review the related works that have
been previously proposed for key management in WSNs.
To be more specific and to improve the comparison, we
focus on the hierarchical/heterogeneous networks rather
than distributed and homogeneous WSNs.
The idea of using a pairwise key scheme to secure
communication links in WSNs is proposed by Chan et al.,
[14]. In this scheme, each node stores pairwise keys between
other nodes in the entire network. This scheme allows node-
to-node authentication; however, upon node capture all the
keys in the WSN are revealed. Furthermore, the scheme
is not scalable for large networks. In [26], a low-energy
key management protocol for clustered WSNs is presented,
where all sensor nodes of the cluster are randomly assigned
to each gateway within the clusters before deployment.
Recently, a probabilistic unbalanced and distributed
scheme is presented for heterogeneous WSNs in [31]. Their
scheme leverages the existence of a small percentage of
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powerful (more capable) sensor nodes beyond the low-
power sensor nodes. The powerful nodes are equipped with
additional keys and act as gateways within the network.
These nodes are assumed to be tamper proof if they are
captured by an adversary. It has been shown that their
scheme, which is based on the work proposed entirely in
[11], not only provides an equal level of security but also
reduces the eﬀects of both single and multiple node capture
attacks.
A uniform framework for random key management
in the distributed peer-to-peer WSNs with heterogeneous
sensor nodes is proposed in [12]. Indeed, similar to [31],
the deployment of some heterogeneous sensor nodes (called
high-class nodes) amongst the low-class sensor nodes has
been studied. In this heterogeneous WSN, the connectivity
between a low-class node and a high-class node is more
important than the connectivity between two low-class
sensor nodes. In [31], a hybrid security mechanism is
proposed that can work with or without the presence of
KDC. Here, all the sensor nodes are preloaded with a
random set of keys drawn from a pool before deployment.
Whenever KDC is available, each gateway shares a public and
private key combination with KDC. The authors evaluate
connectivity, reliability, and resiliency of their scheme, but
the memory requirement may not be scalable in certain
situations.
In [18], the concept of incorporating deployment knowl-
edge for key establishments in heterogeneous WSNs is pre-
sented. This scheme relies on prior deployment knowledge
and location information. It should be noted that in some
applications such information is not available.
An eﬃcient public key-based heterogeneous sensor net-
work key distribution scheme is proposed in [32]. This
scheme provides facilities for in-network processing, which
helps optimize usage of sensor resources incorporating a
certificate generation using the private key of the base
station. The authors of [2] proposed a key predistribution
scheme for heterogeneous WSNs based on symmetric key
techniques. Note that they do not provide a prefect tradeoﬀ
between resiliency against node capture and memory storage
requirements.
In [33], an identity and pairing-based secure key
management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks is
presented. In this scheme, sensor nodes do not need to store
any key of the other nodes, rather it computes secret sharing
key using pairing and identity properties. In [34], a multiuser
broadcast authentication is presented that emphasizes the
use of public key cryptography in heterogeneous WSNs. The
scheme is of interest but is applicable for special kind of
WSNs with many user nodes.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the notations and network model
used for the clustered WSNs.
3.1. Notations andDefinitions. Let ni andGj denote the senor
node i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and the gateway j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,G}, in
Table 1: Notations and their definitions.
Notation Definition
N
Number of sensor nodes in the
network
A Area that sensor nodes are deployed
G Number of gateways in the network
n Number of neighbor nodes
r
Transmission range of each sensor
node
R
Largest radius of a cluster covered by
each gateway
ni Sensor node ni, i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}
S Area covered by each sensor node









Public and private key of sensor node
ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
xi





Public and private key of gateway Gj ,
1 ≤ j ≤ G
EK (·) The encryption function using thekey K
DK (·) The decryption function using thekey K
degni
Number of links connected to the
node ni
the network, respectively. We assume that each sensor node
and gateway are identified by a unique ID number i and
j, respectively, where N and G are the largest ID numbers.
We use degni to represent the number of edges connected
securely to a sensor node ni. The transmission ranges of all
sensor nodes and all the gateways are noted by r and R,
respectively, where R > r. Therefore, a sensor node and a
gateway can communicate with each other if they are within
the distance r of each other.
Definition 1. A set of sensor nodes N is a covering set of area
A if and only if for each point, say P ∈ A, there is ni ∈ N
that ni covers P. The senor node ni covers point P if it falls
into the transmission range of the node ni, that is, r [8].
The largest radius of a cluster was covered by a gateway
Gj , defined by R, and approximated by multiplying the range
of each sensor node, r, with the number of hops to the
gateway, h, that is, RGj = h× r.
Definition 2. Minimum spanning tree [35]: given a con-
nected weighted graph G = (V , E),a minimum spanning
tree covers all the verticesV(contains |V | − 1 edges) of Gthat
has minimal total edge weight.
Definition 3. Shortest path tree [35]: a shortest path tree of
a connected weighted graph G = (V ,E) is a spanning tree of


















Figure 1: A simple clustered WSN with two gateways and 16 sensor
nodes deployed in the area A.
G, consisting of a root node s, that the distance between s and
all other vertices in G is minimal.
The goal of a minimum spanning tree is minimum
weight, while the goal of a shortest path tree is to preserve
distances from the root [35].
Definition 4. Digital signature [30]: a digital signature algo-
rithm is a mathematical scheme and a cryptographic tool for
demonstrating nonrepudiation, authenticating the integrity
and origin of a signed message. A private key is used by
the signer to generate the digital signature for the message,
and the public key is used by anyone to verify the signature.
Note that ECDSA and RSA are popular digital signature
algorithms.
All other notations used in this paper with their defini-
tion are summarized in Table 1.
3.2. NetworkModel. In this section, an explanation regarding
secure operation of the clustered WSNs is presented. Then,
an elaboration on how to establish security in the initial
phase of bootstrapping and clustering of these networks
is given. In this model, it is assumed that the number of
gateways is relatively small in comparison with the number of
sensor nodes, that is, G N , and the gateways are aware of
their location information and can communicate with each
other and the base station (BS) securely. An illustration of
a typical clustered WSNs is shown in Figure 1. To meet the
coverage requirements, we assume that all sensor nodes are
distributed uniformly and randomly in the monitoring area
A. Note that sensor nodes have no knowledge about their
geographic location information.
In this model, two phases of operations, namely preload-
ing and deployment, are proposed. In what follows, these
phases are explained.
3.2.1. Prior Deployment and Preloading Phase. Before sensor
nodes are randomly deployed in an environment, a server is
used to generate and preload required keys based on ECC
into sensor nodes and gateways. As illustrated in Figure 2(a),
a sensor node, say ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is preloaded with its own
public key, that is, Puni , private key, that is, P
r
ni , and the public
key of all existing gateways in the network, that is, {PuGj |
1 ≤ j ≤ G}. Consequently, the gateway Gj is preloaded with
the public key of all gateways (including its own) {PuGj | 1 ≤
j ≤ G}, its private key PrGj , and the public keys of all sensor
nodes {Puni | 1 ≤ i ≤ N} in the network. These keys are
embedded in the sensor nodes and the gateways.
3.2.2. Deployment Phase. In clustered WSNs, sensor nodes
are deployed randomly and uniformly in a manner similar
to distributed WSNs as explained entirely in [11, 36]. The
gateways are deployed within the field, such that each sensor
node can hear from at least one gateway. This is achieved by
varying the transmission range of gateways, R, in the network
during the initial communication setup. We assume that the
gateways know the location of the BS and communicate with
the BS directly or in a multi-hop manner securely.
4. Proposed Secure Clustering
Sensor nodes in clustered WSNs should be securely par-
titioned into clusters. Therefore, we assume that if the
adversaries exist in the field, they are unable to comprehend
the exchanged information. In Figure 1, a simple network
with two gateways (G1 and G2) and 16 sensor nodes (n1
to n16) is illustrated. The gateway Gj in each cluster should
securely discover all the sensor nodes which belong to it.
Additionally, sensor nodes should be aware of their assigned
gateway/cluster.
As depicted in Figure 2(b), each gateway Gj broadcasts
the message BGj to all sensor nodes with a random delay, that
is,













Here, M denotes the broadcast message and as presented
in (1) Gj calculates BGj as follows. First, a one-way hash
function h(·) is executed over the (M‖IDGj ), where “‖”
denotes the concatenation operator. Second, an elliptic curve
digital signature [30] is calculated over the hash results using
the private key of the gateway Gj , that is, ECDSPrGj . The final
message should be accompanied by the public key of the
gatewayGj , that is, PuGj , messageM, and IDGj . This broadcast
will be repeated several times to ensure that the maximum
number of sensor nodes receives it.
For the purpose of message authentication, upon receiv-
ing the broadcast message, the sensor node ni makes a
list for all the received messages from the gateways as
 = {BG1 ,BG2 , . . . ,BGk}, where k, 1 ≤ k ≤ G, is the
number of gateways from which a sensor node received a
broadcast message. Priority of the generated list is based
on signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the received message, that
is, PBG1 > PBG2 > . . . > PBGk , where the PBGk is the
received signal power from the gateway Gk for 1 ≤ k ≤
G. Afterwards, each sensor node ni will verify the message



































Figure 2: An illustration of information exchange prior to and after deploying sensor nodes and gateways: (a) embedding keys into gateways
and sensor nodes, (b) information exchange between sensor nodes and gateways during secure clustering.
integrity using ECDSA with public key of the gateways and
compares the received public key with its pre-loaded one.
Note that verifying the authenticity of the public key of
a gateway is finding out whether the attached public key
of the gateway is the same as the one embedded in the
memory of a sensor node. If the received public key does
not match the pre-loaded one, sensor node ni will reject
the broadcast message. This prevents sensor nodes from
performing expensive verification on the fake signatures
broadcasted from the adversaries [37].
Furthermore, each sensor node ni can determine the
distance dni from the desired gateway Gj incorporating
received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [38]. The minimum
distance from the gateway Gj is called one-hop distance as
d = min{dni , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, in which sensor nodes in
this distance can communicate with the gateway directly.
Using a global positioning system (GPS) for location finding
[36] and time distance calculation [15] requires extra
hardware costs and tight time synchronization, respectively.
Furthermore, it has been shown in [38] that employing RSSI
is more reliable in determining connectivity compared to
the location information, as the location information is not
available in various applications.
The Breadth-First search algorithm [39] is used by the
gateway in each cluster to find which sensor nodes select
the gateway Gj as their cluster head. Note that a similar
algorithm is used in [6]. The gateway Gj broadcasts a
message requesting sensor nodes to notify the gateway if they
are within the communication distance d from the gateway.
In this case, each sensor node ni encrypts its ID concatenated
with its public key using the public key of the desired gateway.
This message is transmitted by a sensor node at maximum
power to acknowledge the desired gateway in the top of its
list  as follows:





where EPuGj (·) denotes the encryption function using the
public key of gateway Gj . Then, the gateway Gj decrypts this
message by using its private key as follows:
Gj : DPrGj (A) = IDni‖Puni . (3)
In this case, the gateway Gj compares the received public key
from the sensor nodes with the ones that are embedded in
its memory prior to deployment. This helps to prevent an
adversary from throwing illegitimate nodes into a cluster and
mounting a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
As a large number of sensor nodes will respond to a
gateway, avoiding contention is diﬃcult. Since contention
causes collisions, this aﬀects the survivability of the network.
Therefore, a suitable medium access control (MAC) protocol
is required to be installed in each sensor node. It is noted
that assuming sensor nodes to be time synchronized is
infeasible because of the large number of nodes. To overcome
this problem, the contention-based and self-stabilizing MAC
protocol presented in [40] is incorporated here. Eventually,
each gateway will compile a list of all the sensor nodes in its
cluster along with their IDs and public keys.
At this point, the public keys of sensor nodes and
gateways are authenticated. Now, each gateway Gj will ask
its one-hop sensor nodes n1i (e.g., n8, n10, and n14 of cluster
2 in Figure 1) within the cluster to broadcast a message to
ask its one-hop neighbors in the cluster to report to n1i. In
this case, sensor node n1i acts as the parent node to the nodes
in its one-hop neighborhood. Similarly, the other neighbors
ask their one-hop neighbors to report themselves. Therefore,
every node within the cluster will connect to the gateway in a
single or multi-hop route, that is, n1i, n2i, n3i, . . ., nhi, where
h is the number of hops from a node ni to the gateway Gj . All
these sensor nodes send their information to the n1i node,
and n1i notifies the gateways about these sensor nodes.
Every sensor node which has selected Gj as the gateway
and is within the preferred cluster will be discovered by
the gateway Gj . Note that a unique path exists from each
node to the gateway as each node has just one parent. For
routing the information to the gateway in each cluster, an
appropriate routing algorithm is required. It defines the path
that the packets can be forwarded to the gateway. Therefore,
a minimum cost path algorithm can be used to find the
optimal spanning tree rooted at the given node.
Theorem 5. The nodes that immediately follow the root
node ni in the minimum cost tree constitute the minimum
neighborhood of node ni. The minimum cost routes between the
node ni and the gateway Gj are all contained in the minimum
neighborhoods of the nodes [25].
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4.1. Secure and Survivable Routing. In this subsection, we
present the routing algorithm for the sensor nodes to
forward data toward the gateway in each cluster. If data from
neighborhoods are highly correlated, then the minimum
spanning tree (MST) is beneficial in terms of survivability
and network lifetime [41]. However, in the case of low
correlation amongst sensor nodes, shortest path tree (SPT)
should be incorporated to achieve survivability and better
network lifetime [41]. Additionally, shorter paths are more
secure than the longer paths (as we explain more in
Section 6.1). Note that using the shortest path limits the
number of paths which can be used to relay data toward
the gateway. In [42], a shortest cost path routing algorithm
for maximizing network lifetime based on link costs is
presented. The costs reflect both the communication energy
consumption rates and the residual energy level.
Here, the use of link estimation and parent selection
(LEPS) scheme was employed as proposed in [43] as a
routing algorithm. In this method, each node monitors all
traﬃc received within the one-hop range, including route
updates from the neighbor nodes. Using the least cost path,
it manages the nearest available neighbor node and decides
the next hop. To find a least cost path, one needs to calculate
the costs of all edges between each sensor node then obtain
a set of least cost paths. To accomplish this, we use the cost
function as formulated in [5].
(i) f (Eni): the function of remaining energy of the sensor
node ni, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}.
(ii) dni ,ni′ : the distance between sensor nodes ni and ni′ .
(iii) F(eni,ni′ ): the error function between sensor node ni
and ni′ .
Then, the cost function for a link between sensor node ni and




)α + f (Eni) + F(eni,ni′
)
, (4)
where α is free space loss exponent and typically α ≥ 2. The
error function is related to the maximum data buﬀered in
sensor node b and the distance between sensor nodes ni and




) = c0 · dni ,ni′
b
, (5)
where c0 is a constant coeﬃcient. To find the least cost path
from a sensor node ni to the gateway Gj , the number of hops
should be considered as well [5].
4.2. Symmetric Key Establishment. After secure clustering,
broadcast authentication, and determining the desired rout-
ing algorithm among sensor nodes and gateways, sensor
nodes should establish secure communication between each
other to reach the gateway securely in a multi-hop path.
Since gateways are aware of the one-hop neighbors of the
sensor nodes and have enough information to control sensor
nodes, they send pairwise keys to each sensor node and its
potential one-hop neighbors. To achieve this, gateway Gj
will send the pairwise key to the sensor node ni which is
common between its neighbors ni′ regarding the least-cost
path routing algorithm.
First, the symmetric key generated for the sensor node
ni and ni′ , that is, K
ni′
ni , should be encrypted using the
public key of the sensor node ni, that is, EPuni (K
ni′
ni ), for 1 ≤
i, i′ ≤ N . Then, each gateway Gj unicasts this message to
the sensor node ni. Each sensor node decrypts this message
using its own private key Prni and obtains the symmetric key
K
ni′
ni . Since this message should be encrypted by the public
key (based on ECC) of every individual sensor node, then
disclosing symmetric key is not possible to the adversary. As
an example, in Figure 1, the sensor node n4 will receive the








In the proposed scheme, we do not consider unicast
authentication for performance reasons. However, the fol-
lowing explains unicast authentication mechanism for the
proposed symmetric key establishment method.
Unicast Authentication. The question is how sensor node ni
ensures that the encrypted symmetric key, that is, EPuni (K
ni′
ni ),
is originated from gateway Gj and not from the adversary?
To address this issue, ECDSA authentication can be
incorporated as follows. To ensure that the message, that
is, EPuni (K
ni′
ni ), is unicasted from the gateway Gj , the elliptic
curve digital signature can be calculated by the gateway
on the message. Therefore, sensor node ni can verify the
signature using the public key of gateway Gj , and this
assures that the message is coming from a legitimate gateway,
and not from an adversary. This scheme requires N times
signature generation by the gateways, and all the sensor
nodes should verify and decrypt the unicasted message. Note
that this increases the computation cost as the verification
of a signature is an expensive operation. However, a one-
time digital signature generation can reduce some of the
overheads.
Another scheme is to allow each sensor node and its cor-
responding gateway to obtain a shared symmetric key during
the first broadcast authentication (secure clustering) incor-
porating elliptic curve Diﬃe-Hellman (ECDH) method.
Then, using symmetric key, the unicast authentication can
be performed by generating a message authentication code
(MAC). Therefore, any unicast from the gateway can be
authenticated by the sensor nodes.
Authentication methods imply overheads in computa-
tion and communication times. Therefore, a trade-oﬀ must
be achieved between the required level of security in the
authentication and the time costs, otherwise the arising
overheads could be against the survivability of the network.
Message Freshness. Beyond guaranteeing confidentiality and
authentication, it is important to ensure that data is recent,
fresh, and no adversary replayed old messages. A sensor node
ni can achieve this through a nonce (which is a unpredictable
random number). In the proposed scheme, before unicasting
the symmetric keys by the gateways, sensor node ni can
send a key request message to the gateway Gj accompanying
with a random nonce, i.e., Nni and encrypted by P
u
Gj .
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Therefore, when a gateway wants to unicast the symmetric
key (encrypted by Puni) to node ni, gateway Gj includes its
random nonce, that is, NGjand Nni to the unicast message.
After this exchange, node ni ensures that the message is
recently initiated and is not a replay of old messages.
4.3. Survivable-Secure Connectivity. To better present the
connectivity in each cluster of the proposed infrastructure
for a WSN, we define a graph G = (V ,E) to model the
connectivity between a set of sensor nodes. Each sensor node
is represented by a vertex in V , V = {n1, . . . ,nNc}, where Nc
represents the number of sensor nodes within each cluster
(In Section 5.1, we study the average number of sensor nodes
inside a cluster.). For any two nodes ni and ni′ in V , the
edge (ni,ni′) ∈ E exists if and only if the nodes are within
communication range of each other. The node degree is
defined as the number of edges connected to the node. For
example, in Figure 1, degn4 = 3. Now, let us assume that
node ni wishes to send information to the node ni′ , and let
P(ni,ni′) be the received power at ni′ . In this case, gateway
Gj compares the SNR with the environment noise threshold,
and if it is more than the noise threshold, then ni can send
a message to the ni′ . In this situation, these nodes have
achieved survivable connectivity and the edge (ni,ni′) exists.
To obtain the P(ni,ni′) in each cluster, the following steps
should be completed.
(1) The gateway broadcasts a start message.
(2) Each sensor node ni transmits a message with its IDni .
(3) All the sensor nodes record the received signal
strength.
(4) The gateways request each sensor node to report (the
recorded information) to the gateway.
To achieve secure connectivity, in addition to the above
conditions for survivable connectivity, sensor nodes should
have previously established a symmetric/secret common key
K
ni′
ni for each edge in E. In this case, the proposed graph
is securely connected. Finally, the gateway Gj will be aware
of the degree of each sensor node within its cluster. Note
that degni determines the amount of symmetric keys which
should be loaded from the gateway Gj to each sensor node.
5. Node Degree Analysis in
the Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme for establishing security for clustered
WSNs is based on using PKC. The required symmetric key
for each sensor node depends on the node degree and routing
algorithm. In the proposed scheme, each sensor node has one
secure path to the gateway across multiple hops. Therefore,
the degree of connectivity of each sensor node may be
diﬀerent. Our routing algorithm is based on minimum
neighborhood path, but some sensor nodes may have a
higher neighborhood degree. Therefore, it is interesting to
see how many neighbors a sensor can have related to the
proposed scheme.
The question is what is the number of nodes in a certain
area S in the environment of A? Since sensor nodes have a
random and uniform deployment, one can assume a Poisson
distribution [11]. Therefore, the probability mass function
can be defined for the random deployment as
P(n | S) = Probability of n nodes is in area S. (6)
From the Poisson process and node density as ρ = N/A, one
can write









Then, the average number of nodes in the radius of r and area









To determine the probability of having average number
of sensor nodes in neighborhood of a sensor node, one can
write
Pr(n = n | S) =
(
ρ · S)ρ·S(
ρ · S)! · e
−ρ·S. (9)
As the ρ · S >> 1 regards the Sterling’s formulas, one can
simplify that
Pr(n = n | S) = 1√
2πρ · S
. (10)
It is interesting to note that the density of sensor nodes after
the clustering will be the same because the deployment of
sensor nodes is randomly uniform.
To calculate the probability that each sensor node has at
least n neighbors, the minimum node degree can be written
as follows:










As an example, assume that N = 1000 nodes are to be
deployed randomly in an area ofA = 1000×1000m2 and the
transmission range of each sensor node r = 100m. From (8),
the average number of neighbor nodes is found as n ≈ 32,
and the probability of having this as neighbor degree is about
7.2% (10). Note that the number of neighbor nodes defines
the degni and the number of symmetric keys that should be
stored dynamically in each sensor node consequently.
As shown in Figure 1, the one-hop neighbors for gate-
ways G1 and G2 are {n1,n3,n7} and {n8,n10,n14}, respec-
tively. To establish secure communication between nodes in
routing path, the gateway G1 sends secret keys to the sensor
node within its cluster by encrypting them with the public
key of the given node. For example, one-hop neighbors
of sensor node n10 are {n11,n12,n13}, then it receive these
{Kn10n11 , Kn10n12 , Kn10n13 } symmetric keys encrypted with Pun10 . All
the sensor nodes in the network will get the secret key shared
with their neighborhood nodes similarly.




R ≈ r × h
...
Figure 3: Approximating the cluster size from the number of hops
and average node degree of each sensor node.
5.1. Average Number of Sensor Nodes and Number of Hops
Inside a Cluster. Since we assumed the sensor nodes to be
uniformly deployed in the field, we propose the following
approximation for the average number of nodes per cluster
and cluster size. Let Nc be the number of the sensor nodes
inside a cluster with radius R. It is clear that, Nc follows
the Poisson distribution similar to the node degree analysis




where Nc is the average number of sensor nodes inside the




where h is the maximum number of hops between a node
and the gateway as shown in Figure 3. From (8), then
Nc = nh2, (14)









It should be noted that in a real scenario with a fixed range
of gateway, R, increasing the range of each sensor node, r,
should be accompanied by decreasing the number of hops
for energy saving purposes and node lifetime. Therefore, the
average number of sensor nodes inside a cluster remains
unchanged. As illustrated in Table 2, we vary the range of
sensor nodes from 25m up to 100m and obtain the relevant
maximum number of hops.
6. Performance Analysis
Here, we analyze the memory storage, communication
overhead, and resiliency for the proposed scheme.
6.1. Link Compromise Probability. The previously proposed
schemes based on probabilistic key pre-distribution, and
there is a known trade-oﬀ between the secure connectivity,
Table 2: Analytical number of hops with various sensor node
transmission ranges for a fixed gateway range R = 200.
r n Nc h
25 2 128 8
50 8 128 4
75 18 128 3
100 32 128 2
memory storage, and resiliency against node capture. Here,
we adopted the definition of resiliency as proposed entirely
in [14].
Definition 6. Let us assume that x nodes are randomly
captured within a cluster. Then, the probability that the link
between two fixed noncompromised nodes is not aﬀected is
defined as resiliency. The inverse of resiliency also called the
fraction of the network that can be compromised.
In multi-hop routing, it is commonly well known that
choosing short multi-hop paths instead of long multi-hop
paths is beneficial. This is because as the length of a multi-
hop path (number of hops) increases, the probability of path
compromise increases as well. Therefore, for the proposed
scheme, we calculate the probability of the link between
sensor node ni and gateway Gj to be compromised without
capturing them directly. Let us assume the following:
(i) xi: the probability of node ni to be compromised.
(ii) h: the number of hops from a sensor node ni to reach
the gateway Gj .
Therefore, the probability that the given path being compro-
mised P(l), given that the sensor node ni and the gateway Gj
are not compromised, is
P(l) = Pr
[
the link between sensor node ni and
the gate way Gj is compromised
]






After establishing the routing algorithm, because the number
of sensor nodes in neighborhood is diﬀerent, the probability
of node compromise directly or indirectly will be diﬀerent.
This compromise probability depends on the attacker model.
In Figure 4, the eﬀect of increasing, number of hops on
link compromise probability is illustrated in terms of node
compromise probability xi. Since our routing algorithm
is based on minimum neighborhood degree, we try to
reduce the degree of each node to decrease the indirect link
compromise probability and have better resiliency against
node capture attack.
6.2. Simulations. We assume a network with N = 1000
sensor nodes is randomly and uniformly deployed in an area
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Figure 4: The impact of number of hops on link compromise
probability.
of A = 1000 × 1000m2. We choose the number of the
gatewaysG = 10 to cover a considerable area of sensor nodes.
The transmission range is varied for each sensor node from
25m to 100m to achieve diﬀerent average node degree n,
ranging from 2 to 32. The maximum range of each gateway
is set to R = 200m. The simulations are performed using
QualNet, scalable wireless network simulator [44].
Through simulations, we observe the number of neigh-
bor nodes which are involved in the routing algorithm
and are communicating securely (using allocated symmetric
keys). In Figure 5, the secure neighborhood degree is plotted
for each sensor node for the proposed network model.
About 300 nodes are communicating with just two sensor
nodes and about 25 sensor nodes are communicating with 7
other neighbor nodes securely. We run the simulations three
times, and the results are almost the same. Therefore, the
maximum number of symmetric keys which are required to
be dynamically loaded to the sensor nodes is always less than
the average number of nodes n for the proposed scheme.
6.3. Measuring Storage Saving. In this section, the memory
storage requirements for sensor nodes and the gateways are
analyzed. In the proposed network model, the number of
gateways is much less than the number of sensor nodes, that
is,G N . As each gateway is pre-loaded with {PuGj ,PrGj ,Puni},
consequently the memory storage requirement for each
gateway is obtained as
MG = (2 +N)× Bu, (17)
where Bu is the key size for public key cryptography.
On the other hand, each sensor node ni is pre-loaded



























Figure 5: Number of neighbor nodes involved in the routing
algorithm toward the gateway with N = 1000; G = 10; r = 100m.
Table 3: Number of encryption/decryption during secure cluster-
ing and pairwise key establishment.
Operation No. of computations
Secure clustering
ECDS generation, and broadcast Gj → ni G
ECDS verification by ni N
Encryption EPuGj (·), ni → Gj N
Decryption DPrGj (·) by Gj N
Pairwise key establishment
ECDS and encryption by EPuni (·), Gj → ni G
ECDS verification and decryption by DPrni (·) N
stores additional symmetric keys to communicate with their
neighbors, that is, {Kni′ni }, then
Mn = (G + 2)× Bu + dm × Bk, (18)
where Bk denotes the size of symmetric key cryptography,
and dm is the maximum neighborhood degree.
It should be noted that since the gateways are tamper
proof, the number of keys stored in each sensor node can be
further reduced by incorporating the same pair of public and
private keys for all the gateways, that is, PuG and P
r
G. Therefore,
the total memory storage requirement for each sensor node
can be written as
Mn = 3× Bu + dm × Bk. (19)
The proposed scheme requires less memory space than
probabilistic schemes based on the work proposed in [11,
14], where those schemes requirem×Bk bits. As an example,
assume that ECC (163-bit) is used for the communication
between sensor nodes and the gateway and the SKIPJACK
(83-bit) cryptography is used in the communication between
each sensor node and its neighbors. Therefore, from (19),
the worst case memory requirement for each sensor node is
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Table 4: Comparison of the proposed scheme with recent existing works.
Property Proposed [31] 12]
Resiliency High Low Low
Key establishment Guaranteed Not guaranteed Not guaranteed
Scalability Scalable Authentication problem Not scalable
Memory requirement Eﬃcient Less eﬃcient Eﬃcient
Mn = (3) × 163 + 7 × (83) = 1, 070 bits. As shown in our
simulation results in Figure 5, the maximum node degree
in the proposed scheme is 7. However, in the probabilistic
schemes, the storage requirement is (200)×83 = 16, 600 bits.
The scheme proposed in [31] requires 54 × 83 = 4, 482 bits
to be stored in each sensor node for the balanced scheme
and 30 × 83 = 2, 490 bits for the unbalanced scheme with
connectivity of 67%. Therefore, the proposed approach saves
almost 57% of memory storage in comparison with the
scheme presented in [31]. Note that the proposed scheme is
deterministic and completely connected. As one can deduce
from (17), the number of keys stored in each gateway is 1,002
keys. Note that in this work as well as [12, 31] and several
previous works reviewed in this paper, it is assumed that
gateways aremore powerful than the sensor nodes in terms of
memory, computation, and communication capabilities. In
Table 4, the proposed scheme is qualitatively compared with
its counterparts.
6.4. Communication and Computation Overheads. Inher-
ently, randomized key predistribution schemes (including
the basic scheme and its extended schemes reviewed in this
paper) suﬀer from lack of structure because the key ring
k is chosen randomly from a key pool. Consequently, the
communication complexity is Θ(k), and increasing k results
in a dramatic increase in communication overhead. The
number of messages passed in the network is a metric related
to the power consumption and communication overhead. It
is well known that transmitting is the most costly operation
on a sensor node (e.g., the cost of transmitting one bit of data
using MICA mote sensor node is approximately equivalent
to processing 1000CPU instructions) [45]. We define the
communication overhead as the sum of packets sent and
received per cluster in the network. The average number of
packets can be estimated as the sum of the following.
(i) Packets sent from Gj to ni as a message B in each
cluster.
(ii) Packets sent by each sensor node toward the gateway
within the cluster as a message A.
(iii) Unicast encrypted messages (pairwise secret keys)
that each gateway sent to the nodes within its cluster
(Kni′ni ).
6.4.1. Cost of Secure Clustering and Pairwise Key Establish-
ment. In Table 3, the number of encryptions and decryp-
tions during the secure clustering and pairwise key establish-
ment is reported. Therefore, the cost of secure clustering, i.e.,
CSC, can be formulated as follows
CSC =G× CECDSPrGj +N × CECDSVPuGj
+N × CEPuGj (·) +N × CDPrGj (·),
(20)
where CECDSPrGj
is the cost of generating an elliptic curve
digital signature using private key of gateway Gj , CECDSVPuGj
is the cost of verifying the signature using the public key
of gateway Gj by sensor node ni, CEPuGj (·)
is the cost of an
encryption using public key of gateway Gj by sensor node
ni, and CDPrGj (·)
is the cost of a decryption using the private
key of the gateway Gj performed by the gateway Gj .
6.5. Compromise Analysis and Key Revocation. Sensor nodes
are deployed physically in insecured environments; hence,
they are prone to be compromised. When a sensor node
is captured, we assume that all information and stored
key materials will be exposed to the adversary. In the
proposed key management scheme, each sensor node stores
the pairwise keys between its potential neighbors. After an
adversary captures one of its neighbor nodes, she will be
able to decrypt the information coming from other neighbor
nodes directly. But other links which are not involved directly
in this communication will remain secure. Therefore, the
resiliency of the scheme is high because of its deterministic
nature.
The problem which remains is the injection of false data
into the network by the adversary. In this case, an eﬃcient
malicious behavior detection scheme is required to identify
the misbehaving nodes and revoke them and their keys from
the network. In the distributed and homogeneous WSNs,
the resource constraint nature of sensor nodes limits the
memory, computation, and communication resources which
can be used for revocation. In [46], an eﬃcient misbehaving
detection scheme based on artificial immune system (AIS)
for distributed sensor networks has been presented.
In clustered WSNs using public key infrastructure, a
gateway as a certificate authority (CA) can issue a certificate
revocation list (CRL) containing a list of keys to be revoked.
Since, in the proposed scheme, node-to-node authentication
is considered with the pairwise key allocation, then detecting
and reporting misbehaved nodes is possible.
Upon detection of a misbehaving node by the gateway,
a digital signature including the IDs of all the pairwise keys
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 11
stored in that node can be generated and broadcast within




, for i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. (21)
Note that in the scheme presented in [31] for heterogeneous
and hierarchical WSNs, key revocation is not considered. In
Table 4, resiliency of the proposed scheme is compared with
the counterparts.
6.6. Scalability Analysis of the Proposed Scheme. The main
drawback of the pairwise scheme proposed previously for
distributed and homogeneous WSNs is scalability. In those
networks, if the size of the network increases, the number of
keys required to be stored in each sensor node will increase.
Note that in the proposed scheme, adding new nodes to the
network can be achieved easily by forwarding the required
session key-request message to its potential neighbors and
then toward the gateway. Upon authenticating the gateway,
it can join the network via other nodes securely. Therefore,
the proposed scheme is scalable.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a new secure cluster-
ing scheme for clustered WSNs incorporating public key
cryptography. We take advantage of gateway nodes which
are powerful and tamper proof to establish/revocate the
symmetric keys in each cluster. This key establishment is
completed during the bootstrapping and clustering phase
assuming that the adversary is present in the field. We
have presented an approximation to determine the number
of neighbor nodes for each sensor node obtained from
the average number of neighbor nodes involved in the
routing algorithm toward the gateway. Consequently, we
have analyzed the number of keys which are required to be
dynamically loaded to each sensor node, and a considerable
saving in memory requirements is achieved. High resiliency
against node capture and node-to-node authentication is
accomplished by the proposed scheme. We note that we
have not considered the overhead of the broadcasts from the
gateways, as we assumed that they are powerful. However,
applying network coding schemes will be considered to
reduce these overheads in future works.
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